The Power of Strategic Centering
Harvard Business Review · article · 2026-07-01 source ↗ Reader 🖥️
In a 'dematerializing' economy where corporate value has shifted decisively from physical assets to intangibles, executives should replace industry-position-based strategy frameworks with a single, deliberately chosen 'strategic center' (mission, customer, technology, ecosystem, or friction erasure) that the whole organization orients its resource allocation, opportunity selection, and identity around — because a clear center bounds the opportunity set without closing it, resolves capital-allocation conflicts, and licenses fast 'permissionless' action without requiring hierarchical approval.
practical · mixed (expository definitional framing + argumentative thesis + a chain of narrative case exemplars) — Written by a Columbia Business School professor for an executive HBR audience: it opens with a decision-relevant dilemma (a capital-allocation choice), argues for a normative prescription ('choose one of five centers'), and supports the argument almost entirely through curated company narratives rather than data analysis, comparative testing, or falsifiable predictions. Structurally closer to a consulting framework pitch (cf. McKinsey/BCG two-by-two matrices) than to an empirical strategy-research paper, despite the academic byline.
Structure
| Part | Role |
|---|---|
| Opening dilemma: Novartis capital-allocation committee choosing between a safe factory investment and a risky radioligand-therapy acquisition | hook / motivating puzzle |
| Narasimhan/Novartis outcome data (valuation roughly doubling post-split) | evidence |
| 'The End of the Stuff Economy': tangible-to-intangible asset-share statistic (83% to ~90%), Carlota Perez's technological-revolution cycle, the music dematerialization example | premise-building / historical framing |
| 'What Strategic Centering Is—and Isn't': explicit contrast with purpose, vision, and core competence; three functions of a center (bounds opportunity, resolves capital allocation, enables permissionless action) | definitional core |
| Five Ways to Find Your Center: mission, customer, technology, ecosystem, friction-erasure — each with core question / best-when / risk, illustrated by company narratives | taxonomy + inductive evidence |
| Matching centering type to an industry's dematerialization stage (construction/mining vs. healthcare/education vs. financial services/media vs. software/AI) | practical decision heuristic |
| 'Leading the Centered Organization': the surprising finding that centered-org leaders are highly engaged and visible, not servant-leaders | qualifying finding |
| Conclusion restating urgency ('the most important strategic decision a leader can make today') | closing exhortation |
Key terms
- strategic centering / strategic center
A single, deliberately chosen organizing principle — one of five types (mission, customer, technology, ecosystem, friction erasure) — that governs a company's resource allocation, opportunity selection, and organizational identity, replacing 'defensible position in a stable industry' as the strategic anchor. - dematerializing economy / dematerialization
A macro-historical shift (framed via Carlota Perez's technological-revolution cycle) in which the composition of corporate value moves from tangible assets (factories, inventory, equipment) to intangibles (software, data, brands, capabilities), cited at roughly 83% tangible in 1975 versus ~90% intangible today. - permissionless action Strategic Centering
Decisions and actions taken by employees at any organizational level without seeking hierarchical approval, made viable specifically because a shared center gives everyone a common criterion for judging whether an action fits. - friction erasure (fifth centering type)
Organizing a company around the systematic identification and removal of unnecessary difficulty in a domain, without anchoring to a mission, customer segment, technology, or ecosystem — treated as a peer category equal in status to the other four.
Propositions
- explicitApproximately 90% of corporate value today is held in intangible assets, versus roughly 83% tangible assets on Fortune 500 books in 1975 — a near-total inversion.conf: medium
- explicitA company without a clear strategic center faces recurring capital-allocation conflict, because every investment decision becomes a contest between competing internal logics.conf: medium
- explicitdevelopedA clear strategic center enables 'permissionless' action throughout an organization, increasing decision speed and reducing the payoff to internal political maneuvering.conf: mediumsupportsHow Fast-Growing Companies Can Make Better Decisions · p4 — Both propositions describe the same underlying mechanism — a shared organizing reference point (a 'center', or a curated-options-plus-outcome-accountability system) that lets decentralized actors act coherently without case-by-case hierarchical approval — from strategy and org-design angles respectively.extends ←A Leading Restaurateur on What It Takes to Scale a Winning Culture · p4 — Enlightened hospitality functions as Meyer's strategic center: a fixed stakeholder-ordering rule that gives frontline staff a decision rule ("who am I on the side of") enabling permissionless action without direct sign-off, the same mechanism extract-hbr-strategic-centering attributes to a clear strategic center generally.
- explicitThere are five viable types of strategic center (mission, customer, technology, ecosystem, friction erasure); organizations with the clearest strategy have one dominant center and subordinate other considerations to it.conf: high
- implicitNovartis's roughly 2x aggregate valuation increase since 2018 (across the parent company and its Alcon/Sandoz spinoffs, versus Haleon) is substantially attributable to Narasimhan's decision to center the company on innovative medicines.conf: low
- explicitLeaders of the most successful centered organizations are deeply engaged, highly visible, and intensely present — the opposite of the delegate-and-step-back 'servant leader' archetype celebrated in prior management literature — and provide direction without dictating methods.conf: mediumextends12) Greger Teigre Wedel: Når sjefen har svaret, tier resten · p5 — McGrath's finding that centered-org leaders 'provide direction without dictating methods' converges, from a strategy-leadership context, on the heis podcast's claim that inspiration about the vision is the leader's job while inspiration about how to reach it comes better from the team — the same direction/method distinction surfacing independently in engineering leadership.
- implicitStrategic centering is a cause of superior organizational performance and coherence, not merely a narrative pattern that can be retroactively identified in companies that succeeded for other reasons.conf: low
- explicitStrategic centering is conceptually distinct from, and more decision-useful than, 'purpose,' 'vision,' or 'core competence.'conf: medium
- explicitThe type of centering an organization should adopt should be matched to how far its industry has progressed through dematerialization (physical-output industries suit ecosystem/technology centering; already-dematerialized industries suit mission/customer centering; industries with dematerialized value but legacy physical-era complexity suit friction-erasure centering).conf: medium
- implicitAn organization can sustain only one dominant strategic center at a time; attempting to hold multiple centers simultaneously degrades strategic coherence.conf: low
Arguments
Executives should abandon industry-position-based strategy frameworks (Porter's five forces, the resource-based view, Blue Ocean strategy) in favor of choosing one of five non-positional strategic centers. strength: medium
Explicit premises:
- Traditional strategy frameworks assume stable industry boundaries, well-defined competitive roles, and durable physical/tangible assets.
- Corporate value has shifted from roughly 83% tangible (1975) to roughly 90% intangible (today), and industry boundaries are dissolving under digital-technology pressure.
- A strategic center — unlike an industry position — bounds the opportunity set, resolves capital-allocation conflict, and enables permissionless action even as industry boundaries dissolve.
Implicit premises:
- The five listed centering types are jointly sufficient (no viable sixth type exists, or unlisted alternatives are inferior) for organizations across all industries.
- What is claimed to have worked for the featured companies (Novartis, Fujifilm, TSMC, Toss, etc.) is generalizable to organizations with different resources, regulatory environments, and competitive starting positions.
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Strategic centering causes the claimed benefits (bounded opportunity, resolved capital allocation, permissionless speed, superior valuation outcomes) rather than merely correlating with firms that already had other advantages. strength: low
Explicit premises:
- Novartis's valuation roughly doubled in aggregate after Narasimhan's mission-centering decision.
- Fujifilm (which centered on transferable technological capabilities) thrived, growing to 72,000+ employees, while Kodak (whose CEO 'misguidedly focused on printing') shrank to a small B2B player.
Implicit premises:
- No confound — differing starting resources, CEO talent independent of the 'centering' framing, market timing, or industry-specific tailwinds (e.g., the broader oncology/precision-medicine investment boom coinciding with Novartis's radioligand bet) — better explains the outcome divergence than centering itself.
- Companies that adopted a clear center and still failed, or companies without a clear center that still succeeded, are rare or nonexistent enough to be immaterial to the argument.
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Narratives
- Novartis under CEO Vas Narasimhan divests consumer health/generics/eye-care businesses and bets on radioligand therapy after centering on 'innovative medicines'; combined post-split valuations roughly double the pre-2018 whole.
→ Establishes the causal plausibility and financial stakes of mission-centering; opens and anchors the entire article - Shopify's incoherent-by-industry-standards portfolio (storefronts, payments, shipping, POS, financing) reads as coherent once seen through its 'make commerce better for everyone' mission.
→ Supports the claim that a mission-center can license expansion across conventional industry categories - Amazon's early 'work backward from the customer' principle carried it from books to AWS to streaming to groceries; Brian Chesky's return to 'founder mode' at Airbnb re-centers the company on the guest after drift toward a host/real-estate-platform identity.
→ Supports customer-centering as a mechanism and introduces 'recentering' as a corrective move available to drifting organizations - Fujifilm, facing the same digital-photography inflection point as Kodak, centered on its underlying chemical/optical/imaging technologies and diversified into cosmetics, medical imaging, and LCD materials; Kodak's CEO focused on printing and the company shrank drastically.
→ The article's most rigorous-looking comparison (same starting shock, divergent choice, divergent outcome) — used to support technology-centering, though the comparison omits other differences between the two firms (e.g., differing patent portfolios, capital positions) - Shell centers on being a 'molecule company' (plastics, chemicals) while BP centers on being an 'integrated energy company' (solar, wind, nuclear); the two centerings lead to different competitive arenas.
→ Illustrates that technology-type centering choices diverge without asserting which was 'better' — one of the few places the article resists declaring a winner - TSMC (Morris Chang) and Samsung both centered on building their national ecosystems' semiconductor/manufacturing capability, receiving state backing (Taiwan's 'silicon shield,' South Korea's national development ambitions) that enabled bet-the-company, multi-decade investments no purely private-market logic would justify.
→ Supports ecosystem-centering, but simultaneously reveals that state industrial policy — not centering per se — may be doing much of the causal work - Toss (South Korea) and DBS (Singapore) center on erasing friction in financial services, expanding from payments into banking, insurance, investing, and even a youth financial-literacy YouTube channel or schoolchildren's payment wearable, without central-department approval ('directly responsible individuals').
→ Supports friction-erasure centering and the 'permissionless action' claim via a concrete example of a low-hierarchy decision (the YouTube channel) that a traditionally structured bank would have blocked
Questions addressed
- ✅ Why do industry-position-based strategy frameworks (five forces, resource-based view, Blue Ocean) fail to guide executives well today?
Because corporate value has shifted from tangible to intangible assets and industry boundaries are dissolving, removing the stable 'position' those frameworks were built to defend. - ✅ What are the available types of non-positional strategic anchor, and how does each work?
Five types — mission, customer, technology, ecosystem, friction erasure — each with a defining question, best-fit conditions, and characteristic risk. - ⭕ How should an organization choose among centering types when more than one is plausibly available to it (e.g., a company with both a compelling mission and deep customer insight)?
The article says centers 'are not mutually exclusive... but the organizations with the clearest strategy have a dominant center' — acknowledging the tension without offering a method for resolving it. - ⭕ What is the base rate of organizations that deliberately chose and executed a clear single center and still failed or underperformed — and how would that be distinguished empirically from cases of poor execution of a correct center versus a center that was simply the wrong choice?
- ⭕ Could the observed correlation run in the reverse causal direction — do already-successful, well-resourced companies retroactively narrate a coherent 'center' onto decisions that were actually driven by opportunism, available capital, or luck?
- ⭕ How, mechanically, does an organization 're-center' (change its dominant organizing principle) without the disruption of the change itself temporarily destroying the very coherence and permissionless-action benefits the framework claims?
Touched on via the Airbnb 'founder mode' and Southwest drift examples, but the mechanics, cost, and failure modes of deliberate recentering are not examined.
Gaps
- illogicalThe article asserts that 'centering is not the same as purpose' (illustrated with a single contrast example — a theater company's vague purpose statement) yet one of the five listed centering types is literally 'mission centering,' and the Novartis exemplar of mission-centering ('innovative medicines that truly help patients') reads as a purpose statement in all but name. No testable criterion is given for distinguishing a properly narrow, decision-useful 'center' from a properly narrow 'mission' or an properly narrow 'purpose' — the taxonomy's own first category partially collapses the distinction the article just drew.
Read next: Rumelt's 'Good Strategy/Bad Strategy' on distinguishing real strategy from restated goals; critiques of construct proliferation in strategy vocabulary (purpose, mission, vision, core values, North Star) as under-differentiated executive-speak. - incompleteEvery named company example is one whose centering choice is, so far, associated with a good outcome (Novartis, Fujifilm, TSMC, Samsung, Toss, DBS, Nvidia, Shopify, early Amazon). Kodak and Southwest appear only as foils establishing other companies' successes, not as tested instances of 'had a clear, deliberately chosen single center and it still failed.' No company that centered and underperformed is discussed, so the base rate of centering's success is unknowable from the article alone.
Read next: Survivorship-bias literature (Mlodinow's 'The Drunkard's Walk', Taleb) on retrospective success narratives fitted to winners; Rosenzweig's 'The Halo Effect' critique of the 'In Search of Excellence' genre of business writing, which has essentially the same evidentiary structure as this article. - uninformedNo attempt is made to separate the causal contribution of 'centering' from contemporaneous confounds: Novartis's radioligand bet coincided with a broadly hot oncology/precision-medicine investment cycle; TSMC's and Samsung's ecosystem success is explicitly bound up with decades of targeted state industrial policy (named in the text itself), yet the article still credits 'centering' as the operative variable rather than state support; Fujifilm's successful diversification depended on pre-existing chemical/materials-science IP whose availability to Kodak is never assessed.
Read next: Regression-to-the-mean and confound-control literature in strategy research; comparative case-study methodology critiques (e.g., Geoffrey Jones or business-history methodology essays) on isolating a single explanatory variable from multi-causal corporate histories. - incompleteEach of the five centering types is given a named risk (mission drift, goal conflict, technological narcissism, geopolitical dependency, scope creep), but no instance is given of a company whose centering failed because that risk actually materialized. Without an observed failure case per risk, the framework offers no falsification criterion — it cannot currently be distinguished from 'successful companies, described after the fact, can always be shown to have had a coherent internal logic.'
Read next: Popper on falsifiability as a demarcation criterion; compare against how the 'resource-based view' and 'core competence' literatures the article dismisses were themselves originally supported by anecdote before later empirical scrutiny — is this critique specific to strategic centering, or standard for the strategy-framework genre at its introduction? - misinformedThe load-bearing statistic — 'roughly 83% of Fortune 500 assets were tangible in 1975 versus ~90% intangible today' — is presented as a clean, uncontested fact via a single secondary citation, without stating measurement methodology. The widely-circulated version of this figure (traceable to the Ocean Tomo 'Intangible Asset Market Value' study) proxies 'intangible value' as market-cap-minus-book-value, which is sensitive to speculative multiple expansion and stock-market bubbles, not purely to genuine changes in asset composition — a methodological caveat the article does not mention despite resting its entire historical premise on the number.
Read next: Methodological critiques of the Ocean Tomo intangible-asset study specifically; broader critiques of using market-cap-minus-book-value as an 'intangibles' proxy in accounting/finance literature.
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