Vibe Coding

Building software by prompting an LLM without reading or owning the generated code — acceptable for disposable software, dangerous as a production practice.

Also known as: vibe coding, Vibe coding, vibe-coding, vibecoding, vibe-coded, vibe coders

How authors use it

Oldest first (extraction date when no publication date is known).

AuthorTheir termTheir meaning
Presentation: AI-First Software Delivery: Balancing Innovation with Proven Practices
Wes Reisz · 2025-01-01
vibe codingExploratory, throwaway coding where speed of learning matters more than code quality — valid for POCs and information gathering, not for production delivery.
Eight years of wanting, three months of building with AI
Lalit Maganti · 2025-03-01
vibe-codingDelegating nearly all design and implementation to AI while acting as a semi-technical manager, without maintaining deep ownership of the codebase.
How Microsoft Developers Use AI in Real-World Coding | BRK103
Microsoft Developer · 2025-05-21
vibe codingLetting an AI agent write code end-to-end without reading or understanding it yourself, acceptable only for throwaway, low-longevity tools (e.g. the presenter's 8-minute hotel-room game); explicitly not how either presenter works on code that has to be maintained and tested.
How AI will change software engineering – with Martin Fowler
The Pragmatic Engineer · 2025-11-19
vibe codingStrictly: not looking at the generated code at all (at most a curious glance), appropriate only for disposable, throwaway work with no long-term capability requirement.
Gene Kim on Vibe Coding - Part III | Episode 412 | Troubleshooting Agile
Douglas Squirrel · 2025-12-24
Vibe coding (as Karpathy originally meant it)Kim's gloss on Karpathy's coinage: throwaway, exploratory code you would never put in front of real users with real data — not a license to skip safety practices in production.
Steve Yegge's Vibe Coding Manifesto: Why Claude Code Isn't It & What Comes After the IDE
Latent Space · 2025-12-26
vibe codingYegge uses the term (which he coined/popularized with Gene Kim's book) for the full practice of driving software production through AI agents rather than hand-written code — not the pejorative 'sloppy, unreviewed AI output' sense the term often carries elsewhere in the corpus; he treats it as a serious discipline requiring 2,000 hours to master.
11) AI-spesial med Vilde Opsal og Anders Sveen
Truls Jørgensen og Audun Fauchald Strand — Heis Podcast · 2026-02-16
vibe codingOriginally: explicitly not looking at the generated code. As actually used by most people: any LLM-driven coding. Anders distances himself: he uses LLM assistance but reviews tests and structure closely
13) Tobias K. Torrissen om kodekvalitet, konferanser og AI
Truls Jørgensen og Audun Fauchald Strand — Heis Podcast · 2026-03-16
vibecodingUsed loosely. He distinguishes: (a) his son spying out apps from home for ad revenue — kortsiktig, kjapt, deretter — which he calls his personal meaning; (b) the more serious 'on-to-pi-tenakt' parallel-agentic large-scale development that doesn't engage with code as an abstraction. He hints these are conflated in discourse.
Claude Code Source Leak Megathread
sixbillionthsheep (Reddit) · 2026-04-01
Vibe codingPejorative for coding without deep understanding, relying heavily on AI to generate code; used both as insult and defense in the thread
14) Øystein Ulseth pendler mellom å lede og levere
Truls Jørgensen og Audun Fauchald Strand — Heis Podcast · 2026-04-07
vibe-codingAI-assisted development in which the developer does not understand the code the tool produces. Ulseth treats this as a distinct, distinguishable mode and is sceptical of it as a sustainable practice.
Podcast: Tiger Teams, Evals and Agents: The New AI Engineering Playbook
Sam Bhagwat · 2026-04-10
vibe codingUsing AI coding assistants (Claude Code, Cursor) for a co-creative development experience — distinct from building agentic applications
LLMs Corrupt Your Documents When You Delegate
Philippe Laban, Tobias Schnabel, Jennifer Neville · 2026-04-17
vibe codingUsed as an example of delegated work — coding driven by high-level intent rather than precise specification
Podcast: The AI Joy Gap: Why Some Developers Thrive While Others Struggle
Michael Parker · 2026-04-20
vibe codingRapidly generating code with AI assistance without deep concern for architecture or quality, relying on a strong backend foundation to absorb the risk
Vibe coding and agentic engineering are getting closer than I'd like
Simon Willison · 2026-05-08
vibe codingWriting software by describing what you want to an AI without reviewing the generated code, accepting it if it works, iterating if it doesn't — no concern for code quality, security, or maintainability
A model that produces code which compiles and passes the tests it was given is not the same as a model that produces robust code
Gary Marcus · 2026-05-09
vibe codersDevelopers with little traditional coding experience who rely heavily on AI to generate code, accepting output that 'feels right' without deep verification
SWLW #701: Gazing at the misty AI Frontier, From Vibe Coding to Agentic Engineering, and more.
Oren Ellenbogen · 2026-05-18
Vibe CodingCasual, exploratory AI-assisted coding driven by prompts and feel — implicitly framed here as a starting point one graduates from
Bliki: Vibe Coding
Martin Fowler · 2026-05-21
Vibe codingBuilding software by prompting an LLM and iterating on the result *without ever reading the generated code*. The defining feature is 'forgetting the code exists.'
Using AI to write better code more slowly
Nolan Lawson (Read the Tea Leaves) · 2026-05-25
vibe codingStretched/reclaimed by Lawson to describe his own slower, carefully-reviewed style of AI-assisted coding ('this other, slower style of vibe coding') — the opposite of its usual sense.
Running Python code in a sandbox with MicroPython and WASM
Simon Willison · 2026-06-06
vibe-codedBuilt primarily via prompting coding agents (here Codex Desktop + GPT-5.5) with the human reviewing rather than authoring; used self-deprecatingly when applied to security-critical code
The New SDLC With Vibe Coding: From ad-hoc prompting to Agentic Engineering
Addy Osmani, Shubham Saboo, Sokratis Kartakis · 2026-06-15
vibe codingKarpathy's original sense, narrowed by the authors: prompting an AI, accepting its output without serious verification, and fixing errors by pasting them back into the prompt. Positioned as the low-structure end of a spectrum, not a synonym for 'using AI to code' generally.
Vibe coding has escaped the terminal
Casey Newton · 2026-07-08
vibe codingBuilding working software — now extended to full consumer desktop apps, not just code — primarily by typing intent into a prompt box and watching an AI agent generate and live-update the result, evaluated on how satisfying and personal the outcome feels rather than on code quality.
Who cleans up after the vibe-coding party?
Sam Learner · 2026-07-11
vibe codersPeople submitting contributions to open-source projects written exclusively with AI tools, in some cases without the ability to understand the code they are submitting.
Inside a Software Factory
Paul Iusztin · 2026-09-04
vibe codingPrompting an LLM to produce code without the discipline, review gates, and process (i.e., without a software factory) around it — the thing a software factory is explicitly built to avoid becoming.

Documents (43)

Propositions touching this concept (60)

By publication month, oldest first (extraction month when no publication date is known).

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Tensions

What replaces PRs?
from: Are pull requests still necessary in software engineering, given trunk-based development and pair programming alternatives, AND given AI-accelerated code generation that radically changes the volume and nature of code authorship?
Assessment: Three axes of disagreement. (1) How much PR ritual to keep — Laforgia Four Eyes keeps the artefact-shape via trailers; Siessegger keeps PR for solo exceptions; Stepanović eliminates the PR-as-event entirely. (2) Whether to engage AI as part of the answer — Kniberg pushes furthest; Parker names the problem; Beck provides the theoretical basis for why the social architecture around the LLM determines the answer. (3) What the unit of value is — for Laforgia it's the evidence of control; for Stepanović it's throughput; for Beck it's trust accumulation; for Kniberg it's human cognitive bandwidth. The Kniberg position (agent-authored PRs, human verifier) is now further complicated by Beck: a human reviewing an agent's PR alone is in single-player mode — trust-negative even when the compliance and quality boxes are checked. Kniberg's more expansive vision (humans focused on higher-level design in a multi-agent team) may preserve trust; the PR-as-solo-review-act does not.
What is code review primarily FOR?
from: Are pull requests still necessary in software engineering, given trunk-based development and pair programming alternatives, AND given AI-accelerated code generation that radically changes the volume and nature of code authorship?
Assessment: Beck's addition is the most significant divergence contribution in v2. He fills the 'review-as-cultural-induction' gap the original panel flagged: pairing produces trust-as-induction (the practitioner is changed by being held accountable in structural ways) rather than merely information-transfer-as-induction. This is not in conflict with the other positions — it provides the mechanism that makes those answers work and sustainable. Quality (Siessegger/Stepanović), compliance (Laforgia), and verification (Kniberg) are all downstream of trust accumulation, on Beck's account. The live disagreement is no longer simply 'PR vs not PR' — it is: if trust is the primary function, and trust requires person-to-person interaction that cannot be manufactured by code artefacts or automated review, what is the minimum set of practices that preserves trust in the AI-augmented era? Architecture-coherence review (the senior reviewer who refuses design-wrong changes) remains unaddressed by all panel members including Beck.
Is AI-accelerated coding a feature or a threat to existing workflows?
from: Are pull requests still necessary in software engineering, given trunk-based development and pair programming alternatives, AND given AI-accelerated code generation that radically changes the volume and nature of code authorship?
Assessment: Beck triangulates between Parker (threat) and Kniberg (feature) with the most analytically precise position in the corpus: the social architecture around the LLM determines whether it's a trust factory or a trust destroyer. This has a direct implication for the PR question: AI-authored code reviewed by a solo human is the worst configuration — two single-player failure modes stacked (AI authoring + human solo review). The crucial remaining gap: no one has produced a synthesis treatment that combines Stepanović's Reinertsen math with Beck's trust-asymmetry argument and Kniberg's agent-as-author shift. Stepanović's framework directly implies AI in-context review could be a near-zero-cost reviewer; Beck's framework implies that same review is trust-negative if done solo. The two arguments together demand a configuration — team-mediated AI code review — that none of the panel members has yet theorised.
Is high-performing software practice context-independent?
from: Are pull requests still necessary in software engineering, given trunk-based development and pair programming alternatives, AND given AI-accelerated code generation that radically changes the volume and nature of code authorship?
Assessment: Parker is the lone explicit voice for context-dependence. Beck's trust factory framing is implicitly universalist — but his unaddressed gaps echo Parker's concern from a different angle: if trust factories only work in pre-existing high-trust organizational contexts, the adoption prescription fails precisely where it is most needed.
How much of the build pipeline should run with no human reading the code (the 'dark factory')?
from: What did the participants of the Thoughtworks 'Future of Software Engineering' Europe retreat (mid-2026) conclude about how agentic AI is reshaping software engineering?
Assessment: Not simple optimism vs pessimism but a disagreement about preconditions and hidden costs. Ocytko's is a projection of where tooling is heading; Bangser and Verraes both supply reasons the projection is unsafe by default — learning-loss and missing prerequisites. Bangser has the stronger argument that the loss is structural (you cannot buy back organisational learning), which even an improving platform does not address.
How far can day-2 operations be handed to self-healing / autonomous remediation?
from: What did the participants of the Thoughtworks 'Future of Software Engineering' Europe retreat (mid-2026) conclude about how agentic AI is reshaping software engineering?
Assessment: Ruby's report is descriptive (where practice actually stands) and Ocytko's is aspirational (where platforms could go); the gap between 'remediation is withheld' and 'failure modes disappear' is precisely the distance the optimists are projecting across. Bangser supplies the reason the gap may not close on efficiency grounds alone — the withheld human step is also the learning step.
Should the harness/platform-building function be centralised, or emerge per-team?
from: What did the participants of the Thoughtworks 'Future of Software Engineering' Europe retreat (mid-2026) conclude about how agentic AI is reshaping software engineering?
Assessment: A precise split about the organisational form of the scaffolding, not its existence: both want shared architecture guidance, but Edwards-Alexander wants the building capability distributed (friction as feature) while Ocytko wants it concentrated in a platform (constraint as feature). Each concedes the other's pole — Edwards-Alexander keeps a central harness; Ocytko warns against over-constraining — which is why this is a live, unresolved tension rather than a clean contradiction.
Reversibility as a hedge vs a one-way commitment to deeper autonomy.
from: What did the participants of the Thoughtworks 'Future of Software Engineering' Europe retreat (mid-2026) conclude about how agentic AI is reshaping software engineering?
Assessment: Incompatible risk models. Verraes treats deep AI-dependence as the danger to insure against; Herlein treats not-committing as the existential danger. They cannot both be the rational strategy: reversibility trades some upside for exit options, while flywheel-commitment trades exit options for compounding lead. The tie-breaker is empirical (will access/economics deteriorate?) and neither has evidence — Fowler's 'tokenpocalypse' data leans slightly toward Verraes.
Where is the locus of safety for non-engineers / citizen developers building software?
from: What did the participants of the Thoughtworks 'Future of Software Engineering' Europe retreat (mid-2026) conclude about how agentic AI is reshaping software engineering?
Assessment: Four different answers to the same governance question: the platform (Ocytko), the director's discipline (Ruby), the tooling interface (Bangser), or nobody-knows-yet (Ördög). Ruby and Ocytko are the true opposites — Ruby puts the burden on a human management skill, Ocytko designs the human out by making failure modes disappear in the platform. That both are held by attendees of one retreat is a measure of how unsettled the citizen-developer problem is.
What is the right metaphor for the human-AI relationship in coding?
from: What is the right approach to building harnesses around AI coding agents, and where are the limits?
Assessment: These metaphors are not mutually exclusive but they lead to different design decisions. Garg's teammate metaphor emphasizes collaboration rituals and may underplay the need for hard constraints (you don't sandbox a teammate). Böckeler's governor metaphor is the most theoretically rigorous but may overclaim the applicability of control theory to creative work. Osmani's engineering metaphor is the most actionable but may miss the social and organizational dimensions. Thoughtworks' organizational metaphor captures the broadest scope but is the hardest to operationalize.
Where does the non-delegable human asset now live — the harness/platform, the oracle, the fundamentals, or the developer's understanding?
from: What is the future of software development in the agentic/AI age?
Assessment: This is the deepest structural disagreement — every author agrees a human residue remains but nominates a different residue, and the choice determines what to invest in and what to teach. The harness-centric (Edwards-Alexander), oracle-centric (Ruby), fundamentals-centric (Nilsson/Bangser), and understanding-centric (Fowler) camps are not merely emphases: they imply different career ladders, different hiring, and different failure modes. Ruby's oracle and Bangser's operational-learning are the most operationally concrete; Nilsson's is the least argued. The absence in the corpus of anyone who holds 'nothing is non-delegable' is itself telling (see unexamined assumptions).
Should the harness/platform and its safety be centralized or left distributed across teams?
from: What is the future of software development in the agentic/AI age?
Assessment: A real operating-model split. Edwards-Alexander's distributed stance rests almost entirely on the DevOps-team analogy (his own extraction flags it as asserted-on-intuition, not argued), whereas the platform camp has the stronger concrete case for the citizen-developer safety problem — you cannot distribute production-data guardrails to non-engineers. The tension is partly reconcilable: Ocytko himself concedes a platform tight enough for non-engineers may be too constraining for expert engineers' identity and innovation, which is exactly the freedom Edwards-Alexander is protecting. The unresolved question is whether one platform can be both.
How far should software be automated — toward the fully-autonomous dark/software factory, or held back to bounded autonomy with humans in the loop?
from: What is the future of software development in the agentic/AI age?
Assessment: The spectrum runs from Ördög/Ocytko (full automation is arriving and desirable) to Bangser/Ruby/Verraes (deliberately withhold the last step). The decelerationists have the better of the safety argument today — Ruby's 'nobody will cede the blast radius' and Bangser's 'removing humans removes learning' identify concrete, unmet prerequisites — but Ördög's context-dependence (backends, COBOL) shows the boundary is domain-specific, not absolute. The real disagreement is less about capability than about who absorbs the blast radius when an autonomous fix goes wrong.
Is preserving human understanding of the system a first-order value, or is comprehension safely offloadable so long as output is verifiable?
from: What is the future of software development in the agentic/AI age?
Assessment: The optimist-practitioner vs. skeptic-humanist axis. Fowler and Nilsson treat comprehension and craft as intrinsic goods whose loss is a harm even when output is fine; Herlein and Ocytko treat comprehension as instrumental — replaceable by verification and platform guardrails. The humanist camp has the stronger long-run argument (Fowler's cognitive-debt case and Ocytko's own 'who-guards-the-guards' problem both show verification and guardrails are themselves fallible artifacts that someone must understand), but the offloadable camp is describing what is actually happening at scale. The crux is whether verifiability can ever be robust enough to make understanding optional — which Ruby's own Goodhart gap (a passable oracle diverging from true intent) suggests it cannot fully be.
How should newly-empowered citizen developers be made safe — constrained platform, human stewardship, or supported API-first tooling?
from: What is the future of software development in the agentic/AI age?
Assessment: All three agree citizen developers are inevitable and must not be blocked, but the safety mechanism differs — encode it in a constraining platform (Ocytko), transfer it through human relationships (Laycock), or expose it as consumable interfaces (Bangser). Ocytko's platform-first case is strongest on the specific failure mode both he and Ördög name (non-engineers leaking or bypassing production-data access), which stewardship alone cannot prevent at scale. Laycock's stewardship answers a different problem — sustaining the junior-to-senior pipeline — that a platform does not. The positions are complementary in principle but compete for the same finite investment, and none supplies a concrete governance model for vibe-coded shadow IT.

Open gaps (88)