Individual AI Abstention

The stance and reasoning of a practitioner who stops using AI entirely on personal, societal, and environmental grounds, treating any partial or selective use as complicit demand-signaling. Distinct from ai-denialism (disputes AI's capability/risk) and from the broader ai-backlash (aggregate sentiment) — this is a first-person total-abstention account.

Also known as: I'm done using AI, quitting AI, AI abstinence, opting out of AI, principled non-use, all-or-nothing AI use

Part of: AI Backlash

Documents (1)

I'm done using AI Brett Codes · 2026-08-10 Reader 🖥️
After using LLM-powered coding harnesses in earnest for over a year, the author concludes that the personal (mental-health, craft, deskilling), societal, and environmental harms of AI outweigh any productivity benefit it offers him, and that no moderate or selective level of use is viable — so he is stopping entirely.

Tensions

What kind of problem is AI adoption in software development, and who is the responsible actor for fixing it?

from: Is skepticism/rejection of AI for software development still rational in 2026 — and where exactly do practitioner "adopt fully" and "abstain entirely" positions actually diverge: on the facts (does AI work), the values (what counts as harm), or the frame (individual choice vs. systemic problem)?

Stop being skeptical about AI for development with Charity Majors (Charity Majors): An engineering and organizational-leadership problem, solved inside the firm by building validation discipline and rebuilding trust between camps.
I'm done using AI (Brett Codes): A personal ethical problem, solved by individual non-participation.
The growing AI backlash (Gary Marcus): A political/regulatory problem, solved by governments constraining the industry.

Assessment: These aren't competing answers to the same question — they're answers to three different questions about where causal and moral leverage lies (org-technical, individual-ethical, political-collective), and the corpus never stages a direct confrontation between them. The weakest of the three on its own terms is Brett's: his abstention argument depends on an untested demand-signaling causal claim, and Marcus's own regulatory framing implicitly undercuts it — if the effective lever is political, one person's abstention is symbolic rather than causally load-bearing, however psychologically necessary it may be for him. Majors's org-engineering frame is the most operationally developed but explicitly scopes itself to teams that already have the discipline to execute it — it has nothing to offer someone in Brett's actual position (an individual contributor under a leadership mandate, with no control over org-level tooling investment).

Does verification/validation substitute for human care and authorship as the basis of software quality?

Stop being skeptical about AI for development with Charity Majors (Charity Majors): Yes — trust can and should relocate from authorship to process; once validation is good enough, shipping code nobody read is not a quality failure.
I'm done using AI (Brett Codes): No — quality is constituted by care, which only a human relationship to the artifact supplies; verification does not substitute for it, even AI reviewing AI.

Assessment: A genuine values disagreement, not a disguised factual one, and under-argued on both sides. Majors asserts a substitution (trust moves from person to process) as self-evidently sufficient without ever specifying what validation would need to guarantee to make 'comfortable shipping unread code' true in practice — a gap her own extraction already flags. Brett asserts the opposite from pure introspection, without considering that his felt alienation might be a contingent response to a personal transition rather than a fact about what quality requires in principle — plenty of trusted professional domains (structural engineering, aviation, pharma) run on process-based rather than personal-craft-based trust and aren't usually accused of producing 'uncared for' outputs. Neither side defends its definition of quality against the other's; each asserts its own as obvious.

Does sustained, earnest, disciplined AI use degrade or improve a competent practitioner's skill and output?

Stop being skeptical about AI for development with Charity Majors (Charity Majors): AI use, wielded by disciplined teams, produces real capability gains without degrading quality, provided validation investment keeps pace.
I'm done using AI (Brett Codes): Sustained AI use degraded his skill, care, and output quality over more than a year, despite being an experienced, motivated, initially-skeptical, earnestly-trying practitioner.

Assessment: Both are single-case evidence dressed as general claims, and the corpus offers a plausible reconciling variable neither author controls for: Parker's joy-gap data shows the split tracks codebase type (greenfield/small-product vs. legacy/enterprise) more cleanly than it tracks practitioner discipline or virtue. Fin is not described as legacy-constrained, and Brett's own most damning anecdote — the Linear/Claude Code project built 'without editing a line of code' — is closer to greenfield vibe-coding than to his day-to-day legacy work. The Majors/Brett disagreement may therefore be less a disagreement about AI's general effect on skilled practitioners and more two data points from different ends of Parker's spectrum, each over-generalized past its actual scope.

Is a moderate, bounded middle path between full adoption and full abstention psychologically and practically stable?

Stop being skeptical about AI for development with Charity Majors (Charity Majors): Yes — bounded, disciplined use is not only viable, it's the responsible default: small deliberate acts of withheld participation (no-AI Wednesdays), a rule against sending unread AI output, and validation discipline are all presented as workable, sustainable practices.
I'm done using AI (Brett Codes): No — for him, moderate/trivial-only use was tried and did not hold; he kept reverting to using AI for everything, and concluded the choice is effectively binary.

Assessment: The sharpest values/psychology divergence in the corpus, and arguably what the central question is actually asking about, since 'is skepticism/rejection rational' presupposes a real choice-menu with a stable middle rung. Majors's evidence for stability (a team ritual everyone follows together) is a much weaker test than Brett's (a year of earnest solo attempt at bounded use against colleagues' and management's full-throttle adoption) — a shared team policy is a different psychological ask than one individual holding a line alone, which is closer to Brett's actual situation. On the specific question of whether bounded use holds under social/organizational pressure to go further, Brett's case is more probative than Majors's, even though his conclusion ('so it must be all-or-nothing') over-generalizes a personal finding into a universal claim.

Is 'skepticism' (doubting AI's capability) the same stance as 'rejection/abstention' (refusing to use AI), and does 'still rational in 2026' apply equally to both?

Stop being skeptical about AI for development with Charity Majors (Charity Majors): Effectively treats them as one stance: her essay is titled 'stop being skeptical about AI for development,' and her prescription for skeptics is to use AI more, with more validation discipline.
I'm done using AI (Brett Codes): Demonstrates, without arguing it explicitly, that the two stances are separable: he is not skeptical of AI's capability, yet rejects use entirely on other grounds.

Assessment: This is the central question's own hidden ambiguity, and the corpus resolves it by demonstration rather than argument. Brett is a live counterexample to the premise, embedded in Majors's own title, that 'not being skeptical' (updating on capability evidence) and 'using AI' are the same move. Once separated, Majors's essay is only an argument against doubting-that-it-works, and has nothing to say to someone who concedes capability and objects on different grounds. So 'is skepticism still rational in 2026' and 'is abstention still rational in 2026' are different questions the corpus never poses side by side — and the practitioner discourse largely collapses them into one fight when they aren't the same fight. On the narrower question Majors actually argues (is doubting AI's capability still rational), the corpus evidence favors her: nobody, including Brett, disputes that current tools work. On the broader question the central question is really asking (is abstention still rational), the corpus offers no resolution at all — only two incompatible frames (organizational-engineering vs. individual-ethical) that never engage each other directly.

Open gaps (1)

incompleteThe demand-signaling logic used to justify total personal abstention ('using it less... means I'd still be...contributing to the harms') is never examined for its actual efficacy: one individual's non-use is very unlikely to measurably affect an industry-scale demand curve, and the piece never considers or rules out collective/regulatory levers (which other corpus material treats as the operative lever for reducing AI's harms) as more effective than individual abstention.
I'm done using AI — read next: extract-the-growing-ai-backlash#p8 argues responsible regulation, not individual choice, is what could have mitigated most of these harms — worth reading against Brett's individual-abstention framing directly.